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Abstract This article traces the emergence of religious anti-communist discourse in Finland’s 
proto-fascist Lapua Movement in the 1930s. Applying constructionist social problems theory, 
it discusses the constructions of communism as a religious social problem, Christian piety as 
a solution to the problem of godless communism, and the religious legitimation of violence. 
The article argues that by identifying Christianity with the Finnish nation the construction of 
communism as a religious problem—itself an outcome of the influence of revivalist Lutheran 
ministers in the leadership of the movement—resonated with the broader audience, but that 
this indigenous religious nationalism lost support with the increasing belligerence of the 
movement.  
 
At the end of the 1920s Finland was a divided country. The Civil War of 1918, fought 
between the socialist “Reds” and the bourgeois and agrarian “Whites” in the aftermath of 
independence from (now Bolshevik) Russia, was a cultural trauma on par with the Spanish 
Civil War.1 The proportional death toll in the repression of the defeated Reds exceeded that of 
all other European civil conflicts in the inter-war era.2 Yet, despite the victory and the official 
banning of the Communist Party, some factions on the White side saw the re-emergence and 
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success of the parliamentary Social Democrat Party and the rumoured (and actual) 
Communist underground agitation as a sign of Finland becoming a ‘half-red’ country.3 The 
divisions caused by the destruction of the civil war continued to run deep both in national 
politics and in everyday life throughout the 1920s.4  
Ostrobothnia in western Finland had been one of the most important bases of the 
Whites during the civil war. When young Finnish Communists attempted to organise an event 
in the Ostrobothnian town of Lapua on the 23rd  and 24th November 1929, local people 
intervened, assaulting the Communists and tearing off their red shirts. A week later, over 
2000 locals participated in a people’s assembly, discussing ‘growing Communist agitation’.5 
In the following weeks similar assemblies were held all over Finland, giving birth to the 
Lapua Movement (Lapuan Liike), which caused the most significant post-civil war political 
crisis in Finnish history. After committing hundreds of kidnappings, physically assaulting 
Finnish communists, shutting down numerous workers’ halls, exerting strong extra-
parliamentary influence in two national elections, threatening the state with a coup d’état 
(twice), and rising up in outright  rebellion in the town of Mäntsälä in February 1932, the 
Lapua Movement was banned and dissolved by state authorities in November 1932.6 
    
Following Pertti Ahonen, we have termed the Lapua Movement a “proto-fascist” 
movement.7 While it could be argued that the movement employed fascist ideas and 
symbolism, it was only its parliamentary successor, the Patriotic People’s Movement 
(Isänmaallinen kansanliike), that explicitly borrowed from its Italian and German 
counterparts.8 According to Vesa Vares, the fiercely nationalist-populist nature of the Lapua 
Movement made it unable to borrow from any foreign movements.9 Thus the movement had 
few coherent objectives apart from decimating the political left, and could hardly fulfil any 
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“fascist minimum” proposed by historians of fascism.10 The familiar themes of aggressive 
nationalism and opposition to internationalist Communism were, however, already present in 
the Lapua Movement. As we demonstrate below, their particular brand of nationalism 
emphasised the conception of Finland as a Christian nation opposing anti-religious 
Communism.  
 
When Finnish society split into two warring camps in 1918, the split was not only 
class-based but also religious. Religion was one of the core values of the Whites and 
Communism was widely perceived as anti-Christian—regardless of the actual religiosity or 
“godlessness” of the Reds. Thus the clergy of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland 
overwhelmingly supported the Whites in the civil war.11 Some of these clergy later became 
leaders of the Lapua Movement in 1929 and 1930.12 It was never a religious movement per 
se, but the revivalist theology—especially aspects of premillenarian eschatology that were 
often in tension with the mainstream Lutheran church—espoused by these leaders left an 
imprint on the rhetoric of the movement.13 Indeed, some historians consider the Lapua 
Movement the pinnacle of political interests and action within Ostrobothnian and Savonian 
revivalist circles.14  
 
Yet, while the central role of ministers and preachers—and at least a tacit support 
from the majority of the clergy15—is often acknowledged, few studies have closely examined 
how Christianity and anti-Communism became intertwined in the discourse of the movement. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse, firstly, how the Lapua Movement constructed 
Communism as a social problem and, specifically, as a religious social problem. We shall 
examine three journals, Aktivisti, Sinimusta, and Lapuan Päiväkäsky,16 the “unofficial 
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mouthpieces”17 of the movement, using the lens of constructionist social problems theory, 
where social problems are conceptualised as outcomes of “claims-making” processes (see 
below). Because all constructions of social problems at least imply a solution to the problem, 
the Lapua Movement’s construction of Communism as an explicitly religious social problem 
led to proposing Christian piety as a solution. Hence, we will focus on three aspects of the 
claims-making: (1) Communism as a religious problem, (2) Christianity as a solution to 
Communist godlessness, and (3) the legitimation of Christian violence against Communists. 
Secondly, we will discuss possible explanations to why Communism became primarily pitted 
against Christianity in the movement literature. We argue that the prominent role of anti-
religiosity and anti-Christianity in the constructions of Communism—a staple, although not 
uncontested position in Christian-Marxist relations since the Communist Manifesto18—was an 
outcome of the leading role of clergy in the movement. Further, we argue that the post-civil 
war identification of the church with the nation enhanced the Lapua Movement message of a 
Christian nation struggling against internationalist Communism. 
 
Constructing Social Problems: Theory and Method 
Looking at social problems course syllabi today reveals a long and relatively homogenous list 
of topics: crime, drugs, alcohol, violence, racism, and environmental problems, among others. 
But what about witchcraft, for example? It was certainly considered a significant social 
problem from the 14th to the 17th centuries.19 Today, however, the practice of witchcraft 
enjoys constitutional protection in many if not most countries of the world. If and when 
behaviour—or perceived behaviour, as in the case of witchcraft—itself seems to be 
insufficient to define a social problem, how do we recognise a social problem in the first 
place? An early formulation captures this tension well: 
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A social problem is a condition which is defined by a considerable number of persons 
as a deviation from some social norm which they cherish. Every social problem thus 
consists of an objective condition and subjective definition. The objective condition is 
a verifiable situation which can be checked as to existence and magnitude 
(proportion) by impartial and trained observers, e.g. the state of our national defense, 
trends in the birth rate, unemployment, etc. The subjective definition is the awareness 
of certain individuals that the condition is a threat to certain cherished values.20 
 
While early sociological research into “deviance” focused on the objective conditions (drug 
use, alcoholism, prostitution, etc.) without problematizing the “problematicness” of these 
conditions, later studies, especially from the 1960s and 1970s onwards, emphasised the 
subjective side. The argument was that looking at varieties of “deviance” ignores the 
processes where some behaviours become labelled “deviant” in the first place. As Blumer 
puts it: “a social problem does not exist unless it is recognized by the society to exist”.21 
Indeed, Spector and Kitsuse’s classic Constructing Social Problems went as far as to say that 
“there is no adequate definition of social problems within sociology, and there is not and has 
never been a sociology of social problems”.22 Spector and Kitsuse argued that the focus of a 
proper sociology of social problems should be in analyzing the processes of subjective 
meaning-making—or “claims-making” as they put it: 
 
[W]e define social problems as the activities of individuals or groups making 
assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions… We 
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use the word [putative] to emphasize that any given claim or complaint is about a 
condition alleged to exist, rather than about a condition that we, as sociologists are 
willing to verify or certify. That is, in focusing the attention to the claims-making 
process we set aside the question whether those claims are true or false.23 
 
Much ink has been spilled since Spector and Kitsuse’s radically subjectivist definition on 
what role the world outside the claims-making process should be granted. For the purposes of 
this article, it will suffice to say our approach falls within a moderate constructionist frame 
that is referred to as “contextual constructionism” in the social problems literature.24 This 
means that instead of focusing solely on the linguistic features of the claims-making 
discourse, we will situate the claims-making within the historical and social context of its 
production. Hence, for us it is important to examine not only what is being said and how, but 
also who is doing the saying and why. Communism in 1920s and 1930s Finland was not a 
figment of people’s imaginations (like late modern witchcraft), or a conspiracy theory with 
only a strained reference to reality (like modern “moral panics” about Satanism, for 
example).25 Communist action—especially the conscious attempt to increase their visibility in 
Finnish society in 1928-2926—was integral in lighting the spark that led to birth of the Lapua 
Movement. Also, many people on the left were critical of established religion and had been so 
already during the Civil War of 1918.27 Nevertheless, the movement could have constructed 
Communism only as an economic, or a political problem, for example. The contextual 
constructionist approach allows us to ask both how and why they ended up constructing 
Communism also as a religious problem.  
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Constructionist sociology of social problems has not made great inroads into detailed 
methodological discussion. Some have advocated a focus on “rhetoric”, but the field has been 
almost completely ignorant of developments in sister constructionist endeavours, especially 
discourse analysis.28 While we acknowledge this ignorance (or indifference), our approach is 
guided first and foremost by our questions, rather than an elaborate methodological toolkit. 
Hence our close reading of the texts consists of thematising the claims about Communism 
into (a) representations of the problem, (b) representations of solutions, (c) legitimations of 
action. This is mostly done through the analysis of (lexical) semantics, especially word 
choice, which influences the understanding of (in this case) Communism as a particular type 
of problem. We will also look at the rhetorical aspects of the texts, especially in terms of 
metaphor. 
 
While the three journals of the movement provide a little-studied primary source, we 
acknowledge the interpretive limitations of such media. We do not presume to claim that our 
sources unproblematically reflect the beliefs of the masses of the Lapua Movement. Most of 
the activities of the movement consisted of direct interventions in the form of political 
violence, rather than political debate. (It was only the successor of the Lapua Movement, the 
Patriotic People’s Movement, that had to refine its discursive capabilities in parliamentary 
work.) Yet, the fact that the journals were directed at movement “insiders”, instead of 
engaging in broader social debate, gives us a sense of the audience and the discourses that the 
audience was assumed to be receptive to. The articles in the journals themselves provide 
some evidence of this resonance, in the form of responses to earlier pieces that echo the 
original ideas. Furthermore, most of the leaders of the movement contributed to the journals, 
and the ways in which they constructed their anti-Communism in the journals were also 
repeated in mass meetings.29  
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Communism as a Religious Problem 
 
The roots of Finnish anti-Communism were “indigenous” in the sense that at the time of the 
eruption of the Lapua Movement, its explicit mission was to salvage the White order—
institutionalised in the expression “home, religion and fatherland” (koti, uskonto ja 
isänmaa)30—of 1918, rather than simply mimic the international fascist movement.31 A 
particular form of revivalist Lutheranism had been associated with the Finnish nationalist 
project since independence, both by contemporary historians and the broader public.32 Quite 
soon after the consolidation of the movement religion became a prominent interpretive 
repertoire offered to supporters for understanding what kind of social problem Communism 
was. Religion was not the only aspect of the Communist “problem”, but the discourse of the 
movement journals leaves no doubt that it was seen as a significant factor—indeed, according 
to Risto Alapuro, the whole Lapua Movement was characterised by a sense of a counter-
attack against Communists who mocked the sacred values of the religious peasantry.33 This 
religious aspect was strong enough to make Ernst Nolte argue that Christian sentiment played 
such a dominant role in few other extremist movements.34  
 
Firstly, Communism was a religious problem because it was, according to the journal 
authors, explicitly anti-religious, and anti-Christian in particular. The articles and editorials 
expressed this both by statement and through metaphor. In the more matter of fact style 
reminiscent of broader European discourses, K.R. Kares—one of the clergymen leaders of the 
movement—claimed that Communist Soviet Union was the source of anti-Christianity. 
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Soviet propaganda, Kares claimed, was spread to Finland in the form of blasphemous 
Marxists and liberals, who wanted to separate religion from education.35 According to an 
unnamed author in Lapuan Päiväkäsky in 1931, Christianity was the first obstacle on the 
course to a Socialist utopia. Despite Socialists’ statements that religion should be a private 
matter, the movement discourse claimed that Socialists were actively working towards 
weakening the status of Christianity.36 
  
The wording is important here: It was not just Communism in the Soviet form, but all 
“Marxism” that was seen as incompatible with Christianity. Following the broader pattern of 
splits on the European left,37 Finnish Communists saw the Social Democrats as their “social 
fascist” enemies.38 But for the Lapua Movement they were all the same. Socialism would 
inevitably lead to communism, and the Social Democrats were the intellectual heirs of 
Communism.39 Social Democrats possessed the same anti-Christian worldview as 
Communists and any claims that a Christian could be a socialist were met with mockery and 
disdain by the journal authors.40 Instead, true Christians should stay vigilant in the face of 
increasing Communist influence—as one Aktivisti author put it—lest Christianity, the religion 
so dear to the Finns, be destroyed by the godless Communists.41   
 
A variation of the anti-Christian theme was the claim that Communism/Marxism was 
a religion in itself: Karl Marx had founded the socialist religion,42 the god of which was 
Lenin.43 Abandoning one’s Socialist convictions meant that one had to abandon his or her old 
Marxist gods.44 Thus Communism/Marxism/Socialism became a heresy rather than an 
example of atheism or anti-religion, and the political enemy became a spiritual enemy. 
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This rather fluid definition of communism as something ranging from anti-religious to 
a religion itself was not unique to the Lapua Movement but rather common in the Finnish 
right-wing of the 1920s. Similar worries over the immoralities caused by ”erotic bolshevism” 
and socialism being a trojan horse of communism were expressed already before the 
emergence of the Lapua Movement. For many Whites, communism was not an ideology but 
something ranging from an expression of humanity's savage instincts to a plot of the 
Antichrist.45 
 
Secondly, some of the articles in the movement journals took a more rhetorical, 
explicitly religious claims-making style. The editorial of the first issue of Aktivisti—written 
by the aforementioned K.R. Kares46—is an example of this. He asserted that the Soviet Union 
was the ”throne of Satan”, and anti-Communism was a prime example of legitimate ”holy 
anger”.47 For another author (identified only by his/her initials), Communism was the ”horned 
head of the east”, and joining the Communists in the hopes of better employment prospects 
was likened to pledging allegiance to Satan.48 The Soviet Union, the land of the “horned 
head”, was named ”the satanic empire of the Lord of Darkness.”49 Vihtori Herttua—one of 
the leading “triumvirate” of the Lapua Movement and a revivalist minister50—warned of the 
“beastly gaze of the Antichrist” that was directed towards Finland from this satanic empire.51 
No compromise was possible between proper religious patriotism and Communism—
between God and the Devil.52 In this rhetoric, the active members of the Lapua Movement 
were echoing the perception of Marxism as an instrument of Satan among the broader 
revivalist culture of Ostrobothnia.53 
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Finally, in addition to actively seeking the eradication of Christianity, Communist 
godlessness was constructed as leading to a broad breakdown of morals and social 
institutions. In an article titled ”What is Communism?” Matti Jaakkola, a clergyman and an 
integral figure of central Finland's violent radical nationalism,54 revealed to the reader the 
horrors of the Soviet Union, including a complete collapse of morality, decency and family 
values. This catastrophe was caused, said Jaakkola, by a lack of religion. Communists had no 
conscience or respect for humanity. Because God’s word was not heard any more in the 
Soviet lands, all good personal qualities like discipline, diligence and honesty had 
disappeared.55 Another author claimed that the harassment of priests and general mockery of 
religion in the USSR had resulted in alcoholism, violence and overall degeneration among the 
youth.56 Without religion, phenomena detrimental to the nation, such as hatred between the 
classes and class consciousness, would flourish.57 Thus Communism should be opposed by a 
wide, unanimous front of Christian decency.58 For Jaakkola and some others, the problem of 
godless politics was intimately connected to antisemitism: Communism was invented by the 
Jews and Stalin – a Jew himself, according to the author of the article – attacked the 
Orthodox church and its property because “he was born with Jewish greed”. 59 Nothing 
represented Communism better than a Communist Jew.60 Although antisemitism never 
became a mass phenomenon in Finland,61 among the anti-Communist crusaders it was fuelled 
no doubt by an awareness of the high number of Jews in the Soviet and European Socialist 
elite.62    
 
The same opening issue of Aktivisti that featured Jaakkola’s analysis of Communism 
also carried an article by Vihtori Varpio (yet another clergyman), aptly titled “Communism 
does not have the right to live”. His construction of Communism follows a now-familiar 
Manichean pattern: There was no possibility of rapprochement between Christianity and 
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Communism. Communism was rabidly anti-Christian and materialist, offering nothing more 
than mere temporal pleasure to its adherents. While Christianity was powered by love, and 
respect for private property and the fatherland, Communism was fuelled by pure hatred and 
lacked all respect for ”human life, private property and marriage.”63 Varpio was not the only 
one to claim that Communism went against all God’s laws with its materialism and 
opposition to capitalism.64 In this discourse, capitalism joined the key conservative values of 
home, religion and fatherland—although this only applied to Finnish capitalism: international 
capitalism was under suspicion due to its perceived connections with the Jews.65 
 
Christianity as a Solution to the Problem of Communism 
The discourse of the Lapua Movement’s journals constructed the solution to anti-Christian 
Communism in two ways: by reminding the Finnish people of the intimate connection 
between religion and nation, and by legitimating the movement’s mission with a divine 
mandate.  
 
Firstly, the heritage of 1918—home, religion and fatherland—was the backbone of the 
Finnish nation, and had to be preserved. In the tellingly titled “The Creed of White Finland”, 
the author stated that in order to be a proper “White Finn”, one had to believe in God and the 
Holy Trinity.66 A good patriotic peasant was also a God-fearing one, and fought for God and 
the fatherland.67 Gustav Arokallio, a pro-Lapua minister, emphasised the importance of 
Christianity for the survival of Finland and the Finnish nation.68 This intimate intertwining of 
religion and nation was demonstrated pointedly in articles discussing the plight of the 
Ingrians, the Finnish-speaking sister people left behind in the USSR. The Ingrians 
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maintained, the articles claimed, their “Finnishness” by remaining Lutheran despite Russian 
and Soviet oppression.69 Indeed, Lutheran Bibles and hymnbooks were called “Finnish 
books”, and their possession could allegedly lead to imprisonment by the Soviet authorities.70  
 
The Lapua Movement had a keen sociological eye for the reproduction of their 
idealised Christian Finland. Socialising the youth into this Christian heritage became 
paramount and, consequently, education a central battleground. “Communist infiltration” of 
Finnish elementary schools had to be stopped in order to prevent them from imposing their 
godless views on the youth of the nation.71 Karl Olsson, a Lutheran canon, demanded 
changing the freedom of religion legislation so that children of non-religious parents would 
still have to undergo compulsory religious education, even against the wishes of their 
parents.72 Moreover, religious education in grammar schools was considered essential, and 
the textbooks in all levels of education were to be infused with “the right quality and spirit”.73 
Indeed, the preliminary political programme of the movement, drafted in November 1930, 
included increasing the amount of religion in school curricula as one of its aims.74  
 
K.R. Kares extended this concern over Finland’s Christian future from education to 
public life in general. His article ”The Public Life of Our Nation Must Not be Paganised” was 
published in Lapuan Päiväkäsky in September 1931. Already as a parliamentary 
representative of the right-wing Coalition Party, he had led the conservative Christian front 
against the 1922 Freedom of Religion Act and retained the idea that Finland was 
“paganising” its public life.75 Aspects of this “paganisation” included, for example, allowing 
parents to opt their children out of religion classes in schools, supporting “unchristian” family 
values by providing welfare for divorced mothers, and portraying abortion in a positive 
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manner.76 Kares’ language resonated with its audience: an anonymous author in the first issue 
of Lapuan Päiväkäsky in 1932 dreaded the possibility of the social democrats removing 
Christian influences from Finland and “paganising” the nation.77 The mission of the Lapua 
Movement, said Kares, was to force members of parliament to make initiatives to counter this 
“paganisation”.78 The same message had been voiced even before Kares: Karl Olsson, writing 
in Aktivisti in 1930, argued that only Christianity could offer a solid moral base for a country. 
Europe without Christianity would be a wilderness akin to Asia or Africa.79 All countries that 
were not Christian, were pagan.80 Having established the intimate connection between the 
Finnish nation and Christianity, constant vigilance was required to uphold the patriotic 
legacy.  
 
Secondly, the Lapua Movement journals constructed a special relationship with God 
and the Finnish nation. God created the Finnish nation, and carried it through good times and 
bad times, including the Civil War in which He had given strength to the Whites to win the 
war.81 He continued to direct the Finnish nation for he was ”the commander of the journey of 
our nation.”82 One author even proposed that God had taken the Finnish nation under His 
special tutelage, (temporarily) abandoning the Jews as the chosen people.83 It was fairly 
common for Finnish radical nationalists to promote a teleological view of history. In their 
opinion it was Finland's destiny to expand into territories inhabited by Finno-Ugric peoples, 
and beat communism and the Soviet Union. These incredible feats were possible as God was 
considered to be on Finland's side.84 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the claims made in the journals accredited the Lapua 
Movement with carrying on this divine guidance, thus embodying the special relationship 
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between God and the Finnish nation: God was on the side of the Lapua Movement;85 he had 
blessed the Movement, who were working for the benefit of God and the fatherland, 
attempting to impose God's law on earth.86 Only a fool could not realise that it was God who 
was behind the Lapua Movement: “If the doubters do not realise that the power in the 
movement comes from above, they have deaf ears and blind eyes”.87 K. R. Kares had already 
pronounced that Vihtori Kosola—the man most often identified as the leader of the 
movement—had been chosen by God to lead the Finnish nation.88 Kosola too stated in his 
memoirs that he was directed by the voice of God.89 A telegram sent to Aktivisti by two 
female supporters praised the Lapua Movement for its anti-Communist action: “We thank the 
‘people of the plains’ [a reference to Ostrobothnians] who have risen up in this noble fight, 
urged by their consciences and God. ‘From God this has come and it is great in our eyes.’”90 
 
For others, the Lapua Movement was also a vehicle for an even greater divine 
mission: Kai Donner, the movement's main conspirator, wanted to launch ”a crusade” against 
the Soviet Union.91 Donner’s choice of words points to a similar dualism between statement 
and metaphorical language that could be found in the constructions of Communism as 
satanic. In an Aktivisti article titled ”Fatherland’s Christmas” the author describes the 
Christmas of 1929. He paints a dreamlike picture of a bleak Christmas ruined by, for instance, 
communist agitation and desecration of churches: ”We saw Golgotha on our way to 
Bethlehem!” Although it was, of course, the Communists who allegedly ruined Christmas, 
the readers were not spared either: Communist agitation had caused them too to lose their 
faith in Christianity. However, those who stayed firm in their belief were rewarded in the end. 
”The people rose up. The peasants of Southern Ostrobothnia, the revivalists, the fatherland’s 
own people rose up. They came for the second time.”92 The “second time” is both a biblical 
and a historical reference: the first time refers to the life of Jesus on the one hand and the 
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Civil War of 1918 on the other; the second time refers to the second coming of Jesus on the 
one hand, and the birth of the Lapua Movement on the other. Not only was Christianity the 
best solution to the problem that was Communism, but the Lapua Movement had a divine 
mandate to carry out its anti-Communist mission.  
 
Legitimating Christian Violence 
A final question remains: How did the God-fearing, patriotic Lapua Movement thinkers 
justify their violations of the rule of law? The movement turned from agitation to action in 
March 1930. A group of thirteen Lapua activists sabotaged a Communist printing press in 
Ostrobothnia on 28 March.93 The court proceedings of the sabotage act were accompanied by 
a violent mob of two thousand Lapua men, assaulting four Communist witnesses in front of 
the courthouse. The Communists’ solicitor was kidnapped and driven to Central Finland 
where he was then released.94 This was the first of a total of 254 kidnappings in the summer 
of 1930.95 In addition to attacking individuals, movement activists targeted Communist and 
Social Democrat workers’ halls, and other such institutions like theatres and dancing halls. In 
total there were 399 such incidents between 1929 and 1932. In 292 cases the halls were 
closed down, in 47 cases nailed down, and in twelve cases burnt down.96 
 
Alongside direct illegal and violent action, the Lapua Movement put strong pressure on the 
parliamentary elections of 1930 and the presidential elections of 1931. In 1930 a member of 
the movement threatened the country with a coup on radio, if a non-socialist majority, needed 
to pass anti-Communist legislation (blocked earlier by the Social Democrats), was not 
achieved.97 Voters responded by voting in a non-socialist majority government, which duly 
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enacted the anti-Communist legislation right after coming to power. In 1931 K.J. Ståhlberg, 
Finland's first president, ran against current Prime Minister Svinhufvud on the second round 
of the elections. The Lapua Movement sided with Svinhufvud, again threatening the country 
with a rebellion if their candidate was not victorious.98 In this case too, the movement 
triumphed. Ståhlberg—although certainly no Socialist—was a special target of the 
movement.99 He and his wife were victims of an apparently unsanctioned kidnapping in 
1930, and the movement journal Aktivisti was closed down by the authorities in 1931 after an 
article was deemed to urge someone to assassinate the former president.100 
 
As the claims-making in the movement journals makes clear, legislation and 
legislative work should be based on Christianity. Vihtori Herttua, for example, said he could 
guarantee his obedience to the Finnish law only if such a Christian base was found.101 God 
was the sole and absolute legislator, and only he could set laws that went against the sense of 
justice of the common man. If a political party tried to do the same thing, it would inevitably 
fail.102 Thus all legislation had to be drafted with “a righteous mind” to ensure true legality. 
Indeed, the state had to be a servant of God, and not dispute his laws.103 According to one 
Aktivisti author, all that the Lapua Movement wanted to do was to return ”the peace and order 
of God’s law” to Finnish legislation.104 
 
The divine mandate constructed in the movement discourse and the justification of 
illegal action with a transcendent law led to what became known as the “Law of Lapua”—
effectively, a legitimation of vigilante justice. This supreme law necessitated the defence of 
“White Finland” against the Communists even if direct action and illegal means had to be 
employed—it was the will of God that all Marxism be eradicated from Finland.105 Listening 
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to the word of God was more important than obeying the secular law.106 Or, to put it 
differently, patriotic illegality was preferable to unpatriotic legality.107 The authorities’ 
impotence did not mean that blasphemy and mockery of freedom should go unpunished.108 
Hence, fighting for the holiest values of the nation could not be a crime.109 It is noteworthy, 
however, that in contrast to some other extreme right movements, the ‘purifying’ or 
ennobling aspect of violence was not highlighted. On the contrary, the movement's leader 
Vihtori Kosola wrote that “everyone of us knows that when the pious peasant of 
Ostrobothnia, the one who has faith in the God of our fathers and who has always deeply 
respected the law, when a part of the nation like this sees the conscious breaking of the law as 
the only way out, he does it with a heavy heart.” 110 Violence had no intrinsic value, but was 
justified in removing the social problem of Communism. 
 
Once more, the claims-making style included both “secular” statements and justifications—
secular in style, even when referring to the divine mandate of the movement—and more 
explicitly religious language. This religious rhetoric sometimes reached millenarian tones: 
God stood with the Lapua Movement in their struggle against godless Communism, blessing 
their weapons.111 Although the empire of Satan would be beaten by God in the end,112 
Lapuans had to be patient and remain devout believers while fighting against Communism. 
Eventually, and inevitably, God would interfere, however: When the seven plagues of God 
were to appear, the empire of the Antichrist would be destroyed. The Soviet Union and other 
“pagan empires” would wage a war against “a league of nations”, in which the Soviet Union 
would be crushed.113 After the forces of evil exhausted themselves and finally turned to God, 
he would bring peace on earth.114  
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Conclusion: Christian Claims-making in a Christian Nation 
The kidnappings and attacks on the workers’ halls in the summer of 1930 earned the Lapua 
Movement both notoriety and new supporters. They were also the beginning of the 
movement’s disintegration. The media turned against the Lapuans, which in turn pushed the 
movement increasingly into the political fringe.115 By early 1931 it had renounced all political 
parties, claiming to be above their petty struggles—a line that the majority of the movement's 
earlier supporters were not ready to follow.116 This became apparent in 1932 when the 
movement went into open rebellion against the state on 27–28 February, demanding the 
White Guard to rise up in support. However, only four to five thousand people responded, 
while the vast majority of the 100 000 strong White Guard sided with the state.117 By 6 March 
1932 the rebellion was at an end and The Lapua Movement was banned. 
 
As the above analysis shows, invoking religion was central to the claims-making of 
the Lapua Movement. Communism was not just any social problem, but a cancer on the 
Christian body that was Finland. Communism was “the enemy that like a worm gnaws and 
sucks the roots of life of our nation and leaves stinking filth behind it. That plague germ of 
Communism … had to be destroyed.”118 Where Communism was successful, blasphemy 
flourished to the detriment of the Finnish nation.119 It is worth pointing out that despite the 
hatred of Communism, some sympathy towards Communists could occasionally be found: as 
a nobleman Lapua sympathiser noted, Communists were tarnished by the filth of 
Communism, but they were still “good gifts of God.”120 In other words, hate the sin, not the 
sinner. Occasional moments of understanding notwithstanding, Communism was a threat to 
religion, thus—since Finland was a Christian country—Communism was a threat to the 
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Finnish nation. The Lapua Movement had a divine mandate to combat Communism, and it 
was above secular rule of law in its struggle.   
 
In sociological terms, the Lapua Movement’s identification with a divine mission is a 
good example of what could be called, following Berger and Luckmann, legitimation on a 
cosmic scale.121 This is the specific province of “religious social problems”, that is, immanent 
social phenomena that are constructed as parts of a transcendental totality—or a “symbolic 
universe”, as Berger and Luckmann put it.122 The extra-parliamentary politics of the 
movement were “populist” in the sense that they transformed immanent politics into a cosmic 
struggle, by literally demonising Communism. You didn’t have to be even interested in 
politics, you just had to be a good Christian. This was a message that resonated in 1930s 
Finland.123 
  
This is not, of course, extraordinary in itself. Social movements from the German 
peasant rebellions in the 16th century to the Civil Rights Movement in the United States in the 
1950s and 1960s have harnessed religion as an ally. They were not religious movements per 
se—they were looking for social change rather than religious reformation—but they 
legitimated their secular message with claims of divine mandate. But among comparable 
fascist movements, the Lapua Movement was in many ways different. Unlike Mussolini (and 
later, Hitler), who tried to construct a new secular religion,124 the Lapua Movement was 
strictly Christian—or Lutheran revivalist, to be more precise.125  Unlike in the Hungarian 
Arrow Cross, the movement’s Christianity was not simply a front for rabid antisemitism, 
which, with its revisionist views of Christianity, ended up alienating Hungary’s clergy.126 
Although traces of antisemitism could be found, as we have shown above, the Lapua 
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Movement was intimately attached to the national church. Finally, unlike Romania’s 
Legionary movement, with its much more explicit millenarianism and frequent treatment of 
its leader as the personification of Christ,127 the Lapua Movement’s millenarianism was 
occasional at best and its leaders never claimed special status beyond divine inspiration. A 
closer comparison could be made with, for example, the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, 
which was closely connected with the (Catholic) church and saw the protection of the nation 
as a divine mission.128 So, the remaining question is: why did religion become such a central 
trope in the Lapua Movement’s claims-making? In order to answer this question, we need to 
venture beyond the discourse of the movement journals and place the discourse in the social 
context (as in “contextual constructionism”). 
 
The first, and rather banal, conclusion is that religion achieved such a central role in 
the movement’s claims-making because of the central role of revivalist clergy in the leading 
positions.129 These were professional preachers who turned their skill into a political tool 
against perceived godlessness. They also knew each other personally, making them well-
connected within the movement.130 On the one hand, their formal position as ministers of the 
Lutheran national church gave them broad legitimacy to talk about matters of both faith and 
national identity. On the other hand, their revivalist credentials—even if sometimes in tension 
with mainstream Lutheran beliefs and practices—resonated especially in Ostrobothnia, the 
movement’s birthplace. Both aspects explain the local and broader appeal of this politicised 
religion—or religionised politics.131 
 
Secondly, the Lapua preachers did not invent Christian nationalism. In Post-
Reformation Scandinavia citizenship was linked with religious affiliation. After secession 
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from Sweden in 1809, the new rulers in St. Petersburg encouraged Lutheran piety despite 
being Orthodox themselves. From that moment onwards, and especially since the late 19th 
century, with successive freedom of religion legislation, the Lutheran church became 
increasingly identified as the “folk” church instead of a state church. Similarly, important 19th 
century nationalist thinkers like Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen and Sakari Topelius had 
emphasised the unity of patriotism and religion, of the Finnish nation and the Finnish  
Church.132 Furthermore, Lutheranism distinguished Finland from Russia in a much more 
obvious manner than Finland's autonomy did.133 Hence, it was not just the revivalist 
Ostrobothnians that found the Lapua Movement’s message attractive. In fact, the revivalist 
connection – perceived or actual – might have enhanced the effectiveness of the message in 
the eyes of the broader public. While in the 1870s the revivalists were considered to be 
deluded and mistaken, by the early 20th century they had become the representatives of a 
particularly Finnish mode of Christianity and the embodiment of the ideal of the tough, hard-
working and heroic Finn.134 The above historical developments, combined with pan-
European opposition to Soviet Communism, an increasingly deteriorating diplomatic 
situation, and the ever-present legacy of the Civil War, goes some way towards explaining the 
tacit support of some non-socialist politicians as well.  
 
This support—both among the masses, the media, and the conservative political 
elites—crumbled with the increasing belligerence of the movement. Although the 
movement’s close connections with the church and its Christian base is widely acknowledged 
in existing research, few have interpreted the acceleration of violence in the summer of 1930 
and especially in the Mäntsälä rebellion of 1932 as an outcome of millenarian 
apocalypticism. This is not an unthinkable interpretation in light of the discourse of the 
journals: the last issue of Aktivisti was titled “The Resurrection Issue” and was full of 
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Manichean imagery. Gustav Arokallio, a clergyman, wrote that “Communists, the friends of 
enemies, the enemies of citizens, the plague of the fatherland, must be torn up by the root.”135 
Finland was, according Vihtori Herttua, in danger of becoming a slave to either Jewish 
capitalism or Russian Bolshevism.136 Artturi Vuorimaa, one of the leaders of the Mäntsälä 
rebellion, stated that “the road is clear. On one side there's the worldview that is Marxist, 
unpatriotic, against the society, and detrimental to Christianity and religiosity, on the other 
side the decent, Christian, patriotic worldview.”137 In terms of action, the final days of the 
movement, the rise to open rebellion, might also be interpreted as millenarian. As Robbins 
and Anthony put it, millenarianism may encourage volatility and violence: “The perceived 
imminence of the last days may be expected to relativize conventional norms and rules”.138 
As we demonstrated above, some of the Lapua thinkers were not above disregarding the rule 
of law when it contradicted what they saw as the higher authority, God’s law, and clearly 
people who gathered at Mäntsälä thought that was the case as well.  
  
Yet, explaining the violence with apocalyptic escalation would be giving the religious 
element too much due. Religion—indigenous revivalist Lutheranism in particular—was a 
symbol of the post-civil war White order, and as such resonated even among the less pious. 139 
When the movement dissipated, it did so like a secular social movement, not a religious one. 
The masses did not turn into millenarian martyrs when confrontation with the state was 
imminent. Instead—and despite the fiery rhetoric of the leaders—most of them went home to 
their families when the President urged them to do so in a radio speech. Neither did the 
leadership become disillusioned cult leaders. On the contrary, Vihtori Kosola became the 
figurehead leader of the Patriotic People’s Movement, the movements parliamentary 
successor. K.R. Kares, Vihtori Herttua140, and Arne Somersalo – the editor of the movement's 
daily newspaper Ajan Sana – also featured in key roles in the new political party.141 In the 
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particular historical moment religion offered the Lapua Movement—in addition to the 
undoubted piety of the authors whose work the movement journals published—a 
transcendent legitimation of their construction of Communism as a social problem and, 
consequently, its solution through violent, but “righteous”, means. 
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